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joining the SEI, he was a senior software engineer at the US Naval Research Laboratory in 
Washington, DC.  
Introduction 
An open architecture is a development methodology that employs published, widely 
accepted standards for defining key interfaces within a system.  Systems that are “open” 
have components that can be provided by different vendors, allowing performance 
improvements and technology refreshments at a faster pace than “closed” systems.  This 
“open” approach for constructing systems can be augmented by acquisition practices that 
leverage these “open” technical attributes to facilitate competition.  This paper gives an 
overview of open architecture acquisition approaches and investigates whether open 
architecture by itself is sufficient to provide the stated goals of rapid fielding, reduced cost, 
and interoperability among systems.  After that, we compare the open architecture approach 
to another acquisition approach for systems, namely the product line approach.  A product 
line is a set of systems that share a common, managed set of features that satisfy the 
specific needs of a particular market segment or mission and that are developed from a 
common set of core assets in a prescribed way (Software Product Lines, n.d.).  Several US 
DoD systems acquisitions are currently taking the product line approach.  We provide an 
overview of a various product-line-based acquisition strategies and discuss the relative 
advantages and disadvantages of the product line approach.   We argue that open 
architecture principles are an essential ingredient of the product line approach for the DoD.  
Furthermore, the product line methodology consists of a robust set of practices that will 
generally yield more repeatable results of increased performance and lower risk at minimal 
cost. The combination of the two approaches will deliver more benefits to the acquisition 
organization than either approach alone. Finally, we highlight the challenges associated with 






An open architecture is an architecture that employs open standards for key 
interfaces within a system (Open Systems Defined, n.d.).   Because the interfaces conform 
to publicly documented, consensus-based standards, any competent supplier can provide 
conforming implementations for any module, allowing the owner of the system to take 
advantage of competitive bids among suppliers who compete to provide each module.   
The following principles characterize a set of business and technical practices that 
will lead to delivery of increased capabilities in a shorter time-to-field at reduced costs: 
 Modular designs with loose coupling and high cohesion that allow for 
independent acquisition of system components, i.e., composability;  
 Continuous design disclosure and appropriate use of intellectual property rights, 
allowing greater visibility into an unfolding design and flexibility in acquisition 
alternatives;  
 Enterprise investment strategies that maximize reuse of system designs and 
reduce total ownership costs;  
 Enhanced transparency of system design through open peer reviews;  
 Competition and collaboration through development of alternative solutions and 
sources; and  
 Analysis to determine which components will provide the best return on 
investment to open, i.e., which components will change most often due to 
technology upgrades or parts obsolescence and have the highest associated 
cost over the lifecycle. 
 





The need to change the business environment must be the primary factor that drives 
the technical approach.  Accordingly, there are business case decisions to be made about 
how much investment each principle warrants: 
 The use of open standards for key interfaces is a critical aspect of insulating a 
program from many future cost risks associated with upgrading and establishing 
some degree of vendor independence.  The most important business decisions 
lie in identifying the “key” interfaces.  These typically involve architectural 
elements encapsulating the most important system behaviors and/or business 
segments.  This principle is highly correlated to the practices of modular design 
with loose coupling and high cohesion; these help ensure that upgrades and 
system maintenance can be performed with low cost and schedule risk.  
Economic benefit is accrued on a system with a multi-year lifespan (i.e., not 
prototypes or limited production run systems), and components that need to be 
upgraded or migrated to updated hardware over its lifecycle. 
 Continuous design disclosure is especially important for Government 
acquisitions, even though this was, at one time in the past, looked on as a source 
of development overhead cost challenges.  There are two aspects of design 
disclosure: contract deliverables and access to the evolving design and 
development products.  This allows the program office to review the evolution of 
the critical design elements as they evolve, and the ability to exercise data rights 
on all design related information, even if not a formal deliverable.  One of the 
most common “lessons learned” we have heard is failure to get all the artifacts 
that are needed to support competition. Formal deliverables should be limited to 
those things that require a review-comment process or collaboration to ensure 
design synthesis will yield a result that can be validated against the 
requirements.  All other elements of a system design should be made available 
to the customer to observe throughout the design process. Electronic access to 
the design environment and publishing of design artifacts is very low in cost and 
should not be a cause for cost growth by the developer.  This is especially true 
for systems that will have a long acquisition life, and the design information will 
need to be made available to subsequent bidders, if system upgrades or 
maintenance will be competed on a recurring basis (e.g., every five years). 
 Strategic reuse is fundamental to a product line approach.  Enterprise investment 
strategies need to be formulated to determine the business basis for those reuse 
elements.  It will likely cost more to make something reusable (additional 
documentation, commenting, provision for different boundary conditions, etc.) 
and governing the process of managing collaboratively developed and co-
dependent designs is challenging.  The current state of practice in many DoD 
acquisition domains is to build products in which all design elements are tailor-
made to specific solutions and few, if any, of the associated products are 
required to be built for strategic reuse.  This business practice is based on 
minimum emphasis on enterprise reuse, from sponsoring organizations all the 
way to user communities. 
 The Naval Open Architecture Contract Guidebook defines a “peer review” as “a 
refereed, open process used to assess technical approaches proposed by or 
being used by vendors. An ‘independent peer review’ includes external 
membership and is structured to achieve a balanced perspective in which no one 





or recommendations presented to the decision-maker with the authority and 
responsibility to select or make the final course of action or decision.  These kind 
of open peer reviews are a technical management construct that has been hard 
to replicate across a broad continuum and requires lots of communication, 
purposeful governance, and oversight.  Exposing peer competitors to the inner 
workings of each other’s products may require creative intellectual property rights 
negotiations in order to get the benefits of peer reviews and create the most 
innovative and capable products and producers while sustaining a robust 
marketplace for innovative solutions.  
 Development of alternative solutions and sources is a noted weakness of the 
DoD’s acquisition pattern of behavior.  A pattern of continuous competition has 
been proven to establish better pricing and performance. In a recent interview, 
Dr. Jacques Gansler,  former Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, 
Technology and Logistics, stated, “By contrast, whenever we’ve had competitive 
sourcing, we get more than a 30 percent cost savings, on average, with higher 
performance, no matter who wins—and the government most often wins. 
Competition really pays” (Gansler, n.d.).  In order to address this, Congress 
made specific provisions for requiring competitive prototyping as a major aspect 
of the Weapon System Acquisition Reform Act of 2009 (Summary, n.d.).  In 
addition, some programs have been able to use a collection of contracting 
vehicles to establish a framework for continuous competition that gives the 
program manager additional acquisition choices.  There are historical cost 
references that can be used to justify establishing a second source, especially at 
the early stages of system development.  Having healthy competitive tension at a 
more granular level throughout the design and integration process has some 
additional positive, but intangible effects on developer behavior.  Most program 
managers get their best cooperation from their incumbents when there is a full-
and-open solicitation on the street.   
The value proposition on the OA principles discussed here includes an analysis of 
how much change will be needed throughout a system lifecycle.  Underlying technologies 
may change faster than others, depending on the market-space from which they come, and 
the potential demand signal for capability changes by the warfighter or customer need to be 
addressed.  These two dimensions of change need to drive a technology refresh strategy 
and a capability evolution strategy. These are two sides of the same coin and need to be 
woven together to form a coherent program plan.  However, many programs bent on 
executing requirements for initial capability fail to address these dynamics.  They must also 
address how their business goals are aligned to the technical architecture, system 
modularity/coupling/cohesion, design disclosure and data rights analysis, strategic reuse 
strategies, transparency of system design, the need for a variety of alternative sources, and 
lifecycle cost models. 
Open Architecture and Acquisition 
The Navy has extended the work of the DoD Open Systems Joint Task Force 
(OSJTF) to more comprehensively achieve the desired goals of open architecture as a part 
of the Naval Open Architecture (NOA) effort.  NOA is defined as the confluence of business 
and technical practices yielding modular, interoperable systems that adhere to open 





“field common, interoperable capabilities more rapidly at reduced costs” (Updated Naval, 
n.d.).   
The Naval acquisition community is working to adopt these principles.  Fully doing so 
will require a change in technical approach, but that is the easy part. Much harder is to 
change the business practices, particularly in cross-stakeholder governance, across a wide 
range of organizations.  Government-to-industry relationships  can be most effectively 
changed through new competitively awarded contracts.  Changing internal government-to-
government business behavior is harder, in that the contract between parties is implied or 
weak, sometimes in a Memo of Understanding. 
The number of programs adopting these principles has been based on two things: 
cultural barriers and the practical limits of programmatic and technical constraints.  The level 
of adoption has been highly dependent on the drive by individual senior acquisition leaders 
to change business relationships through steps that break from the long-held pattern of 
behavior that has been employed in the DoD for many years.  Adopting OA principles is a 
transformational challenge of the highest order. 
The Navy and Marine Corps are incorporating OA into selected new-start acquisition 
or upgrades to existing programs.  These programs are implementing open architecture for 
either new-start acquisitions or upgrades to existing programs where there is a clear 
business case for opening up the system acquisition and technical characteristics to gain 
better value and warfighter performance.  For new-start acquisitions, there are compelling 
business cases for ensuring that the design boundaries of the system modules are fully 
disclosed and work to standards-based methods.  
Many programs have adopted aspects of OA behavior, but few have taken a full OA 
plunge.  The Navy Submarine Program has achieved the most compelling example of cost 
improvements and warfighting performance across the DoD .  PEO Subs has spearheaded 
the practices of OA, specifically the Acoustic Rapid Commercial-off-the-Shelf (COTS) 
Insertion (A-RCI) and incorporated those methodologies into several other warfighting 
acquisitions for combat control, including imaging, radar, and others.  
Product Lines  
A software product line is “a set of software-intensive systems sharing a common, 
managed set of features that satisfy the specific needs of a particular market segment or 
mission and that are developed from a common set of core assets in a prescribed way” 
(Software Product Lines, (n.d.). 
Software product line practice is a proven and practical approach for software 
system development, including DoD systems.  There are dozens of well-documented cases 
showing the significant, even order-of-magnitude improvements achieved in terms of cost, 
time to deployment, and quality (Catalog, n.d.).  In addition, the international Software 
Product Line Conference maintains a “Software Product Line Hall of Fame,” a collection of 
exemplary software product line examples that other organizations can emulate; currently, 
18 members have been inducted (Product Line, n.d.). 
Product lines result when builders and acquirers recognize that few systems are 
unique.  This is true for systems acquired by the DoD, systems built by DoD contractors and 
suppliers, and systems built by industry for private-sector use.  Building these systems 
individually is not good technical or business practice, and in the DoD, it results in expensive 





diminished operational capability. A product line approach exploits the commonality among 
similar systems, and tremendous cost and schedule improvements and decreased technical 
risk have also resulted. 
At its essence, fielding a product line involves  
1. development or acquisition of core assets, which are software, document, 
process, and management artifacts engineered to be re-used; 
1. development or acquisition of products using those re-usable core 
assets; and  
2. management for planning and coordinating core asset and product 
development. 
The development activities can occur in either order (new products are built from 
core assets, or core assets are extracted from existing products). Often, products and core 
assets are built in concert with each other. Core asset development has been traditionally 
called domain engineering. Product development from core assets is often called application 
engineering. The entire effort is staffed, orchestrated, tracked, and coordinated by 
management.  Error! Reference source not found. illustrates this triad of essential 
activities. The interactions among the symbols indicates not only that core assets are used 
to develop products, but that revisions to or even new core assets might, and most often do, 
evolve out of product development. The diagram is neutral about which part of the effort is 
launched first. In some contexts, already existing products are mined for generic assets⎯a 
requirements specification, an architecture, software components, etc.⎯that are then 
migrated into the product line's asset base. In other cases, the core assets may be 
developed or procured for later use in production of products.   
 
Figure 2. The Essential Activities of a Software Product Line 
Product lines employ planned, strategic reuse across a family of products to produce 
savings in the following areas each time a product is ordered: 
 Requirements.  Most of the requirements are common with earlier systems, and 





 Architectural design.  An architecture for a software system represents a large 
investment in the form of time from the organization's most talented engineers.  
The quality goals for a system—its performance, reliability, modifiability, etc.—
are largely allowed or precluded once the architecture is in place.  For a new 
product birthed from the product line, this most important design step is already 
done and need not be repeated. 
 Components.  Not only code can be reused, but also the internal designs for the 
architectural components are reused from system to system, as is the 
documentation of those designs.  Data structures and algorithms are saved and 
need not be reinvented. 
 Modeling and analysis.  One product line organization reports that one of the 
major headaches associated with the kinds of systems they build—namely, real-
time distributed—has all but vanished. When they field a new product in their 
product line, they have extremely high confidence that the timing problems have 
been worked out, and the bugs associated with distributed computing—
synchronization, network loading,  absence of deadlock—have been eliminated 
because their performance models have been validated across the entire family 
(Bergey & Jones, 2010). 
 Testing.  Test plans, test processes, test cases, test data, test harnesses, and 
the communication paths required to report and fix problems are already 
available.  
 Planning.  Budgets and schedules can be informed or reused from previous 
projects, and they're much more reliable. 
 Processes.  Configuration control boards, configuration management tools and 
procedures, management processes, and the overall software development 
process are in place, have been used before, and are robust, reliable, and 
responsive to the organization's special needs. 
 People.  Because of the commonality of the systems, personnel can be fluidly 
transferred among projects as required. Their expertise is applicable across the 
entire line.  When operational needs call for a rapid deployment of a system, the 
right supplier personnel can be brought to bear immediately. 
 Training materials.  Since systems in a product line have a common look and 
feel, training is simplified and training materials apply across the family. 
These reuse opportunities lead to the advantages touted for a product line approach 
to software system development, which include: 
 Reduced time to deployment.  Turning out a new product in the product line is 
more akin to generation and integration, rather than ground-up coding.   
Cummins, Inc., reports that systems that used to take a year to complete now 
can be turned out in about a week (Clements & Northrop, 2003). 
 Reduced cost.  For example, products in the National Reconnaissance Office’s 
Control Channel Toolkit product line cost approximately 10% of what they 
otherwise would have (Clements, Cohen, Donohoe & Northrop, 2001). 
 Increased productivity.  For example, Cummins estimates that they are now 





only two thirds the software resources, for a productivity gain of 2,100% 
(McGregor & Clements, n.d.). 
 Higher quality. Product lines enhance quality. Each new system takes advantage 
of all of the defect elimination in its forebears; developer and customer 
confidence both rise with each new instantiation.  The more complicated the 
system, the higher the payoff for solving the vexing performance, security, and 
availability problems. 
 Simplified training.  Users competent in one member of the product line are 
generally competent to use others. 
Product Lines and Acquisition 
Product line practice is gaining more and more traction every year in the DoD, 
gaining a foothold and proving its merits in small systems to high-visibility systems of 
systems.   DoD organizations that have adopted the software product line approach include:  
 the Navy’s Program Executive Office for Integrated Warfare Systems (PEO IWS) 
(Error! Reference source not found.) (Emery, n.d.), 
 the National Reconnaissance Office (Clements et al., 2001), 
 the Naval Undersea Warfare Center (NUWC) (Cohen, Dunn & Soule, 2002), 
 the Army’s Technical Applications Program Office (TAPO) (Clements & Bergey, 
2005), 
 the Army’s Live Training Transformation effort (Live Training, n.d.),  
 The Navy’s PEO for Submarine’s products from the Submarine Warfare 
Federated Tactical System family of systems (Error! Reference source not 
found.) 
 






Figure 4. PEO Submarines SWFTS Model for Cross-platform Product 
Commonality 
In addition a growing number of commercial DoD contractors are gravitating to 
software product lines.   The Software Engineering Institute maintains a catalog of software 
product line experience reports published in the open literature; that catalog currently 
includes 54 examples (Catalog, n.d.). 
There are three overall product line acquisition approaches (Bergey & Jones, 2010): 
2. The government can commission a supplier to develop a specific product (or 
products) using the supplier’s own proprietary product line.  This strategy 
involves acquiring products directly from a supplier who has an existing 
product line and a demonstrated capability to build products in the domain of 
interest.  An example of this approach is found in Jensen (2007). 
3. The government can commission a government organization to 
develop a product line production capability and build specific 
products.  This strategy involves acquiring a completely government-
owned product line using the in-house capabilities of a designated 
government acquisition organization.  An example of this approach is 
found in Live Training Transformation (LT2) (n.d.). 
4. The government can commission a supplier to develop a product line 
production capability and perform integration of products from other 
vendors into the production line.  This strategy involves acquiring a 
complete product line production capability and developing derivative 
products through contracting with one or more suppliers. An example 
of this approach is found in Clements et al. (2001). 
Major challenges include the fact that the DoD’s acquisition policies and 





and no institutionalized means exist for funding the development and sustainment of a 
product line across multiple programs. Nevertheless, successful DoD product lines are being 
created by acquisition authorities with vision and foresight enough to overcome the 
difficulties and reap the benefits. 
Comparing Acquisition Approaches 
A product line approach can only be fruitfully applied in the context of building a 
family of systems, whereas an open architecture approach works for even a single system 
that evolves over time.   In a context in which both are applicable, how do they compare? 
Cost.  Both approaches promise lower cost.  Open architecture achieves its cost 
savings by engendering and facilitating competition among suppliers.  However, crafting of a 
competitive market out of a closed and vendor-locked set of business relationships has 
been a major challenge in the past.  Designing an architecture to put into place separately 
acquirable elements requires thorough systems engineering and marketplace awareness.   
The goal is to foment  a true competition in a situation in which there is a high likelihood that 
the incumbent could be the only possible winner by dint of long involvement with the legacy 
system.  Meeting this goal is a business and engineering challenge, but failure amounts to 
leaving in place an unassailable barrier to entry by new suppliers, who may not be able to 
provide the right technical products or (even if they are) not be able to undercut the price at 
all. The product line approach achieves its cost savings by amortizing the cost of the core 
assets across all of the products that use them.  Product line approaches have 
demonstrated repeatable per-product cost savings of 50% (Cohen et al., 2002) to 67% 
(Clements & Bergey, 2005) to 90% (Clements et al., 2001).  The more general open 
architecture approaches have demonstrated savings up at this level, but with lower 
consistency.  For example, the A-RCI program achieved a 5:1 estimated cost savings over a 
ten-year period (Boudreau, 2006).  Savings in an open architecture approach remain 
roughly constant over the number of products, whereas savings in the product line approach 
increase with the number of products.  In product line development, one source of cost 
savings is higher productivity among the developers.  Developer productivity in a product 
line context has been shown to increase by 400% (Toft, Coleman & Ohta, 2000) to 500% 
(Catalog, n.d.) to 2,100% (McGregor & Clements, n.d.). 
Time to delivery.  Open architecture approaches achieve reduced time to delivery 
by fostering enterprise reuse and competition among vendors to bring greater innovation in 
product development methodologies.  Product line approaches achieve reduced time to 
delivery by pre-positioning the core assets required to produce the next product (or next 
version of a product).  The A-RCI project, the ability to take robust solutions from the science 
and technology community and integrate them into tactical sonar system in two years or 
less, a process that would have taken five years or more in the legacy framework.  Product 
line approaches have been shown to reduce time to delivery by 50% (McGregor & 
Clements, n.d.) to 60% (Jensen, 2007) to 67% (Toft et al., 2000) to over 90% (Clements & 
Northrop, 2003; Catalog, n.d.). 
Elimination of duplicate effort.  The DoD suffers from a plethora of almost-alike 
systems, developed in isolation from each other. In the US alone, over 80 companies, 
universities, and government organizations are actively developing one or more of some 
200 UAV designs (UAV Forum, n.d.). In 2004, the General Accounting Office was able to 
identify 2,274 separate DoD business systems (but nobody knows the true number), a 





are all developed and maintained separately, with poor or no acquisition interoperability 
among them.  There is no repeatable or systematic means to take advantage of the 
commonality of these systems and apply common reusable components or features as a 
standard practice.  Building and maintaining one system at a time, compared to a proven 
product line approach, is a process laden with systemic inefficiency, stretching development 
and sustainment budgets to the limit and leaving little left over to work on imaginative new 
solutions.  New software development reuse efforts, where attempted, are ad hoc, 
repository based, and often devolve into a clone-and-own effort.   Open architecture 
approaches do not directly address the problem of duplication (there may be several open 
but duplicate implementations that are not strategically or financially aligned), whereas the 
product line approach gains its benefits by exploiting situations in which duplication would 
otherwise occur. 
Higher quality.  Higher quality results from an OA approach through technical 
practices such as hardware/software independence, modularity with loose coupling and high 
cohesion, integrability, upgradability and business practices such as strategic reuse, 
especially the healthy pressure of competition for component development as well as for 
system integration.  Higher quality results from the PL approach because errors wrung out 
of one system are automatically wrung out of other systems in the same product line. In 
product line development, defects have been shown to drop by 50% (Pronk, 1999) 90% 
(Clements et al., 2001) to 96% (Toft  et al., 2000).   
Open Architecture and Product Lines Together 
While the two approaches differ in some fundamental ways, happily there is no 
reason why they cannot work together.  In fact, the two in combination might represent a 
“perfect storm” of acquisition leverage that can systematically reduce cost, increase 
performance, and drive down risk. The ideal acquisition occurs when both product lines and 
open approaches are applicable in the same acquisition context.  The focus of combining 
the two approaches lies in the architecture, but the challenge to achieving it lies in the 
governance of the DoD acquisition community. 
The architecture of a product line is one of its most important core assets, providing 
the blueprint for how every product will be assembled and the parts (software components 
and supporting artifacts) it will comprise.  Interfaces of those parts are critical to the success 
of the product line’s architecture, for only by mixing and matching instances of components 
suitable for different products can the product line strategy work.  Hence, product line 
architectures are open architectures, in a strict technical sense:  they have “published, 
accepted interfaces to components “that can be provided by different vendors.”   Whether a 
product line architecture is an open architecture in the business sense (in other words, 
whether the components for core assets and products really do come from different 
vendors) is a matter of business policy within the organization that owns the product line.  
Some certainly are.  For example, Nokia’s product line for mobile phones is open outside 
Nokia, allowing external companies to use Nokia’s core asset base to build their own phone 
products (Van der Linden, Schmid & Rommes, 2007).  Hewlett Packard’s product line for 
computer peripheral devices is open across widely disparate organizations within Hewlett 
Packard (Toft et al., 2000). 
An acquisition combining the two approaches could employ strategy #3 in Section 
, overlaid with a requirement that the architecture be open with publicly defined 





to develop a product line production capability and build specific products.  The production 
capability would include the architecture, openly defined;  populating the architecture with 
components applicable across the defined scope of the product line would be awarded on 
the basis of open competition. 
Neither approach embodies unsolved technical challenges.  The main hurdle for both 
is in the domain of management and changing the way that organizations (government and 
private) do business.  As Machiavelli said, “There is nothing more difficult to take in hand, 
more perilous to conduct, or more uncertain in its success, than to take the lead in the 
introduction of a new order of things.”  The Defense Research and Engineering 
“imperatives” (DDR&E Imperatives, n.d.) are as follows:  
 Accelerate delivery of technical capabilities to win the current fight, 
 Prepare for an uncertain future, 
 Reduce the cost, acquisition time and risk of our major defense acquisition 
programs, and 
 Develop world-class science, technology, engineering, and mathematics 
capabilities for the DoD and the nation. 
These imperatives speak to a critical need for bold new ways to acquire and field 
systems for the warfighter.  Product line engineering and open architecture together promise 
the kind of outcomes necessary to address DoD needs. 
Product lines, together with open architecture methodologies have great potential in 
the DoD to unlock opportunities for innovation, reduced risk, improve response to warfighter 
needs, and reduce costs. However, this combined approach will require fundamental 
change in program office behavior, acquisition leadership, resource community 
communication, warfighter interaction, and, most importantly, in business practices.  Moving 
out of vendor-locked expensive business relationships to bring access to affordable 
innovation and flexibility requires a fundamentally different technical and business approach. 
The best method to change government-industry business relationships is by writing the 
desired behavior into the contract—a gradual, but achievable change process.  Changing 
internal government to government business behavior is harder, in that the contract between 
parties is implied or weak.  Program officers that do strategic reuse and combine forces with 
another program to improve enterprise business value are making a bold move.  The reward 
mechanisms for acting on the best value for the Enterprise are not well established.  
Coordinating budgets and aligning schedules across different resource sponsor offices is a 
daunting challenge that needs further exploration, new methods, bold leadership, and 
sustained and steady hard work. 
References 
Bergey, J., & Jones, L. (2010). Exploring acquisition strategies for adopting a software 
product line approach. In Proceedings of the Seventh Annual Acquisition Research 
Symposium. Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School. 
Boudreau, M. (2006, October30). Acoustic rapid COTS insertion: A case study in spiral 
development. Naval Postgraduate School. Retrieved from 
http://www.acquisitionresearch.org/_files/FY2006/NPS-PM-06-041.pdf 
Brownsword, L., & Clements, P.A. (1996, October). Case study in successful product line 





Catalog of software product lines. (n.d.). Retrieved from 
http://www.sei.cmu.edu/productlines/casestudies/catalog/  
Clements, P., & Bergey, J. (2005, September). The U.S. Army's common avionics 
architecture system (CAAS) product line: A case study (Technical Report CMU/SEI-
2005-TR-019). 
Clements, P., & Northrop, L. (2003). Software product lines: Practices and patterns. Boston: 
Addison Wesley. 
Clements, P., Cohen, S., Donohoe, P., & Northrop, L. (2001, October). Control channel 
toolkit: A software product line case study (Technical Report CMU/SEI-2001-TR-
030). 
Cohen, S., Dunn, E., & Soule, A. (2002, September). Successful product line development 
and sustainment: A DoD case study (CMU/SEI-2002-TN-018). 
DDR&E imperatives. (n.d.). Retrieved from http://www.dod.mil/ddre/index.html 
Emery, K. (n.d.). Surface Navy combat systems engineering strategy. Retrieved from 
http://www.nps.edu/Academics/Institutes/Meyer/docs/IWS%20OA%20Briefing%20to
%20NPS%20March0410.pdf  
FedSmith.com. (n.d.). Billions wasted… Retrieved from 
http://www.fedsmith.com/article/313/billions-wasted-dod-because-duplicate-
business-systems.html  
Gansler, J. (n.d.). “Global war” on contractors must stop. Retrieved from  
http://blog.executivebiz.com/jacques-gansler-global-war-on-contractors-must-
stop/7105  
Jensen, P. (2007, September). Experiences with product line development of multi-discipline 
analysis software at Overwatch Textron Systems. In Proceedings, SPLC 2007. 
Kyoto: IEEE Computer Society. 
Live training transformation (LT2). (n.d.). Retrieved from 
https://www.fbo.gov/index?s=opportunity&mode=form&tab=core&id=ba606e9dbff7c6
d266cf16f2fd2a1bee  
McGregor, J., & Clements, P. (n.d.). Better, faster, cheaper—pick any three. MIT Sloan 
Management Review, submitted. 
Open systems defined—terms and defiitions. (n.d.). Retrieved from 
http://www.acq.osd.mil/osjtf/termsdef.html 
Product line hall of fame. (n.d.). Retrieved from http://www.splc.net/fame.html  
Pronk, B. (1999). Medical product line architectures. In Proceedings of the TC2 First 
Working IFIP Conference on Software Architecture (WICSA1) (pp. 357-367). 
Software product lines. (n.d.). Retrieved from 
http://www.sei.cmu.edu/productlines/start/index.cfm  
Summary of the Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009. (n.d.). Retrieved from 
http://levin.senate.gov/newsroom/release.cfm?id=308525  
Toft, P., Coleman, C., & Ohta, J. (2000). A cooperative model for cross-divisional product 
development for a software product line. In P. Donohoe (Ed.), Proceedings SPLC1. 
Kluwer Academic Publishers. 
UAV forum, librarian’s desk. (n.d.). Retrieved from 
http://www.uavforum.com/library/librarian.htm 
Updated naval OA strategy for FY 2008. (n.d.). Retrieved from https://acc.dau.mil 
 Van der Linden, F., Schmid, K., & Rommes, E. (2007). Software product lines in action. 






















2003 - 2010 Sponsored Research Topics 
Acquisition Management 
 Acquiring Combat Capability via Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) 
 BCA: Contractor vs. Organic Growth 
 Defense Industry Consolidation 
 EU-US Defense Industrial Relationships 
 Knowledge Value Added (KVA) + Real Options (RO) Applied to Shipyard 
Planning Processes  
 Managing the Services Supply Chain 
 MOSA Contracting Implications 
 Portfolio Optimization via KVA + RO 
 Private Military Sector 
 Software Requirements for OA 
 Spiral Development 
 Strategy for Defense Acquisition Research 
 The Software, Hardware Asset Reuse Enterprise (SHARE) repository 
Contract Management 
 Commodity Sourcing Strategies 
 Contracting Government Procurement Functions 
 Contractors in 21st-century Combat Zone 
 Joint Contingency Contracting 
 Model for Optimizing Contingency Contracting, Planning and Execution 
 Navy Contract Writing Guide 
 Past Performance in Source Selection 
 Strategic Contingency Contracting 
 Transforming DoD Contract Closeout 
 USAF Energy Savings Performance Contracts 
 USAF IT Commodity Council 
 USMC Contingency Contracting 
Financial Management 
 Acquisitions via Leasing: MPS case 
 Budget Scoring 





 Capital Budgeting for the DoD 
 Energy Saving Contracts/DoD Mobile Assets 
 Financing DoD Budget via PPPs 
 Lessons from Private Sector Capital Budgeting for DoD Acquisition Budgeting 
Reform 
 PPPs and Government Financing 
 ROI of Information Warfare Systems 
 Special Termination Liability in MDAPs 
 Strategic Sourcing 
 Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) to Improve Cost Estimates 
Human Resources 
 Indefinite Reenlistment 
 Individual Augmentation 
 Learning Management Systems 
 Moral Conduct Waivers and First-tem Attrition 
 Retention 
 The Navy’s Selective Reenlistment Bonus (SRB) Management System 
 Tuition Assistance 
Logistics Management 
 Analysis of LAV Depot Maintenance 
 Army LOG MOD 
 ASDS Product Support Analysis 
 Cold-chain Logistics 
 Contractors Supporting Military Operations 
 Diffusion/Variability on Vendor Performance Evaluation 
 Evolutionary Acquisition 
 Lean Six Sigma to Reduce Costs and Improve Readiness 
 Naval Aviation Maintenance and Process Improvement (2) 
 Optimizing CIWS Lifecycle Support (LCS) 
 Outsourcing the Pearl Harbor MK-48 Intermediate Maintenance Activity  
 Pallet Management System 
 PBL (4) 
 Privatization-NOSL/NAWCI 





 Risk Analysis for Performance-based Logistics 
 R-TOC AEGIS Microwave Power Tubes 
 Sense-and-Respond Logistics Network 
 Strategic Sourcing 
Program Management 
 Building Collaborative Capacity 
 Business Process Reengineering (BPR) for LCS Mission Module Acquisition 
 Collaborative IT Tools Leveraging Competence 
 Contractor vs. Organic Support 
 Knowledge, Responsibilities and Decision Rights in MDAPs 
 KVA Applied to AEGIS and SSDS 
 Managing the Service Supply Chain 
 Measuring Uncertainty in Earned Value 
 Organizational Modeling and Simulation 
 Public-Private Partnership 
 Terminating Your Own Program 
 Utilizing Collaborative and Three-dimensional Imaging Technology 
 
A complete listing and electronic copies of published research are available on our website: 































THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 
  
 
 
^Åèìáëáíáçå=êÉëÉ~êÅÜ=mêçÖê~ã=
dê~Çì~íÉ=ëÅÜççä=çÑ=ÄìëáåÉëë=C=éìÄäáÅ=éçäáÅó=
k~î~ä=éçëíÖê~Çì~íÉ=ëÅÜççä=
RRR=avbo=ol^aI=fkdboplii=e^ii=
jlkqbobvI=`^ifclokf^=VPVQP=
www.acquisitionresearch.org 
